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The definition and understanding of Cultural Diplomacy are changing; and they are doing so at a 
moment when the European Commission is rethinking its own external representation in cultural 
terms. The joint ifa/EUNIC conference in April 2016 brought together thinkers to contribute to debate 
on what the closer integration of culture and diplomacy means in practice: what opportunities it of-
fers, what risks it holds and – above all – how we should see the potential scope of culturally-framed 
actions to influence problems traditionally seen as political. Cultural Relations, in other words, are 
seen as more potent than previously understood – but with this understanding comes the need to 
integrate Cultural Relations with diplomacy in search of solutions to challenges that are culturally, as 
well as politically, rooted. This input seeks to outline an approach to the New Cultural Diplomacy 
(NCD). 
 
Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and  
Cultural Relations 
 
There is a problem of nomenclature in the area of 
how nations and people relate to each other 
through culture. In the past, practitioners have 
tried to draw a pragmatic distinction between 
state-to-state relations (diplomacy), state-to-
people relations (public diplomacy) and people-
to-people relations (cultural relations). This has 
been a useful rule of thumb, but never entirely 
satisfactory. Categories are never quite as cleanly 
divisible as this taxonomy suggests, and some at 
least of the distinctions are more purposeful and 
less transparent than they wish to appear. 
 
Part of the problem has been ‘Mission 
Creep.’ Diplomacy, in particular, has looked for 
new areas of application as its old monopoly of 
state-to-state relations has fallen before a combi-
nation of the internet, the domestication of Euro-
pean (and increasingly extra-European) issues, 
and the omnivorous centralisation of even low-
level decision-making in national capitals, which 
has attenuated one of its traditional core func-
tions. Public diplomacy, doctrinally American in 
origin, has become a tool of this centralisation 
process – a way of subjugating the independent, 
long-term, non-governmental business that was 
Cultural Relations to the shorter-term, policy-
directed agendas of government. And Cultural 
Relations has been – at times a little disingenu-
ously – purist about its methods and its aims. 
 
But while the distinction between the differ-
ent streams of activity may be conceptually valid, 
there is no certainty – and perhaps no exclusivity 
– about who should perform them. The clear 
water between diplomacy and cultural relations 
is in part the effect of a rapidly vanishing histori-
cal disdain on the part of many diplomats for 
’soft’ activity, and partly that of the Cold War, 
when that distinction was artificially maintained 
in order to insulate a separate and more neutral 
channel of international communication, albeit 
one that was at times (as we often like to forget) 
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ruthlessly instrumentalised. Today there is a 
growing realisation that cross-over is the shape 
of the future. 
 
Cultural Relations practitioners maintain 
that the hallmarks of their trade are non-
governmentalism and the long view; and that a 
combination of these two core characteristics 
with a relatively neutral medium, culture, allows 
for the earning of trust in a way that policy-
driven diplomatic activity within a short-term 
government cycle cannot. There is truth in this, 
and those two qualities of non-state independ-
ence and a long-term, multi-generational, view 
are crucial. What has changed is the certainty of 
where these two qualities should be located.  
 
Supra-national bodies, and the European 
Union in particular, offer one possible answer to 
the question of location. The tightening lock of 
national government policy, in some cases at 
least, over cultural relations could in principle be 
loosened by collaboration, partnership and a 
pooling of resources under the ægis of the EC, 
always of course subject to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple. It is easily arguable that the EC is better 
placed to take a long view than national govern-
ments, though this is a development that would 
not be without its controversial aspects, and an 
organisation like EUNIC, bringing together as it 
does the national cultural institutions of the indi-
vidual member states, may perhaps offer a vehi-
cle. 
 
Culturisation of international politics 
 
But what is beyond argument is that Cultural 
Relations is becoming more important; and that it 
needs to help shape, much more actively, the 
analysis of international crisis and so, inevitably, 
the business of diplomacy. This will involve all 
sorts of compromises and the loss of (a not al-
ways un-self-righteous) purity in Cultural Rela-
tions practitioners.  
As to why it is becoming more important, 
we are seeing a culturalisation of international 
politics. The emergence of identity politics is 
probably an inevitable long-term result of de-
mocratisation, and of mass communication 
through the internet, and results in what Jef 
Huysmans calls ‘violent democracy,’ a democra-
cy in which the lines of division become vertical 
rather than horizontal – faith, race and ideology-
bound, rather than defined by class. This makes 
for the replacement of old-fashioned politics with 
much more culturally defined identities, and if 
we don’t go quite as far as Tony Blair in seeing 
the replacement of political ideology with reli-
gious ideology as the defining change from the 
20th to the 21st centuries, we can at least see well 
what he is getting at. 
 
Looking at these issues in Brussels in April 
2016, ifa posed the questions of how the EC 
should imagine the role of Cultural Relations in 
its own external policy; and what are the identi-
fying features of a new Cultural Diplomacy that 
will reintegrate serious thinking around the core 
challenges of our societies today. The first fol-
lows broadly from the second: the EC, like every 
national government, needs to be immersed in 
the broader cultural continuum in which the 
movements of people and minds take place. 
 
The meeting organized by ifa took four 
lenses through which to view the question of 
how Cultural Relations could and should devel-
op. They could equally well have been described 
as lenses through which international affairs can 
be usefully inspected: migration, radicalisation, 
heritage and imagination. They are certainly not 
the only ways of looking at either, but they do 
quarter the horizon usefully. Each is an area in 
which traditionally cultural concerns all too ob-
viously shape present political crises. Each is an 
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area, in other words, where the experience, per-
ceptions and tools of cultural relations can be of 
great service to government and to diplomacy, 
and which therefore serve as proving-grounds 
for a newly re-integrated Cultural Diplomacy 
that seeks to effect this re-integration. 
 
Migration 
 
The first is migration, a small word for a huge 
phenomenon that is fundamentally changing our 
continent. Migration itself is of course not new, 
but numbers, speed and intensity are testing the 
cultural as well as the political certainties of Eu-
rope in a way in which they have not been tested 
since the end of the last war – and arguably test-
ing those certainties much more acutely than in 
the late 1940s because the people migrating, be-
ing largely brown or black and mostly Muslim, 
fit with a terrible simplicity onto the matrices of 
prejudice and identity. The growth of political 
resistance to mass migration and its consequenc-
es may be expressed through ‘party’ movements 
like Austria’s FPO, Britain’s UKIP or Germany’s 
Pegida; but it is a quintessentially cultural phe-
nomenon, a sense of eroding personal and collec-
tive identity and a fear of ‘new people’ who are 
different.  
 
How are they different? Language, religion, 
customs, beliefs and prejudices – culture. It is this 
constant sense of cultural difference, seen as 
more fundamental and more intractable than 
human commonality, that risks undermining our 
societies. How we deal with this question, this 
artfully choreographed cultural confrontation, 
will define our futures. As a Syrian architect, 
Marwa al-Sabouni has recently written, ‚I read 
about the heterogeneous urbanism, involving 
zoning by race and religion, in the northern Brit-
ish cities, and in Paris and other major French 
conurbations, and I recognize the beginnings of 
the kind of instability we have witnessed so dis-
astrously here in Syria, We might think we are 
different from each other, but the truth is that we 
are all human.‛ Migration is of course a practical 
problem of management and resources, but as 
Chancellor Merkel has demonstrated, it is also a 
fundamental moral challenge to the exclusivity of 
European societies. Facing it, and dealing with it, 
requires new tools. 
 
Radicalisation 
 
In this context we are very aware of ‘radicalisa-
tion,’ of the imagined road to perdition that is 
taken by young people whose hopelessness in-
tersects with a well-crafted ideology and a sense 
of justice and adventure to take them to action, in 
some cases violent action. It is of course as true of 
Anders Breivik and any number of other white 
supremacists as it is of Muslims, but at the mo-
ment there are more Muslims on that road than 
there are Breiviks. That may change. But whether 
we place more emphasis on the ‘push’ of anomie 
and social exclusion, of professional, personal, 
social or sexual lack of traction – or on the ‘pull’ 
factor of radical ideology and its artfully crafted 
storylines and imageries, we are looking once 
again at a series of phenomena that are steeped 
in culture. And lest we imagine for a moment 
that this crafting is a one-way street, in 2004 
when the Abu Ghraib torture of Iraqi prisoners 
emerged, a spokesman for the Medical Founda-
tion for the Victims of Torture said, ‚There have 
clearly been conscious attempts by psychologists 
to make the techniques culturally relative to a 
Muslim population.‛ We need to understand this 
‘radicalisation’ as a socio-cultural phenomenon, 
driven by some of the forces that Cultural Rela-
tions practitioners understand very well, ‘Dark 
Cultural Relations’ perhaps, and to think through 
better culturally aware and culturally shaped 
responses than the US Army was prepared to 
design for Abu Ghraib. We will never successful-
ly confront or reverse the helter-skelter appeal of 
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violent extremism without equally adept cultural 
responses – and here again we see an overt, ines-
capable and positive role for Cultural Relations 
in mainstream crisis management. 
 
Heritage 
 
Cultural too is the question of heritage destruc-
tion. It is easy enough to put Palmyra and Nim-
rod, Timbuktu and the Sarajevo National Library 
into a file marked ‘Culture,’ but this means very 
little unless we understand that their destruction 
reveals only the epiphenomena of something 
much blacker. There is little value in preserving 
stones in a vacuum: they are an expression of the 
people who built them and used them. Art histo-
ry or ‘the heritage of all mankind’ are not suffi-
cient justification for privileging architecture 
over flesh (‚Grief over the violence that ISIS has 
perpetrated on ‘innocent’ ancient buildings can 
be viewed against reactions towards the mass 
destruction of entire cities‛ – al-Sabouni again.) 
In this contradictory index of grief, the West is 
often found wanting. Once again, though, the 
roots of this destruction, when we follow them 
into the subsoil, are cultural: the destruction of 
buildings, shrines and temples is a cultural geno-
cide, an attack on identity through its symbols 
and expressions. Every act of destruction has a 
cultural meta-message of obliteration, negation 
and destruction aimed at human beings. Under-
standing that the destruction of a Yazidi temple 
or a Shi’ite Golden Dome or a Sufi shrine in Tim-
buktu or Tunis is not more or less than, but an 
integral part of, the genocidal attack on a people. 
The clue (if we need one) is clear: those attacked 
may be racially, religiously, sectarian-ly defined, 
but they are different, or ‘Other’ in the jargon. 
Their bodies and their cultures are parallel vic-
tims. 
 
 
 
Imagination 
 
Finally, we looked at a fourth cultural frontier, 
which we called imagination. This may be a 
slightly surprising rubric, and it is certainly a net 
thrown wide. But so much of the rapidly morph-
ing landscape of international affairs depends 
upon, and helps continually to reshape, the way 
– particularly young – people look at the world, 
that it is necessary to see imagination as the warp 
upon which the woof of culture, and therefore of 
political interaction, is woven: all the cultural 
crises of our day are fed by the instantaneous 
universality of communication to which we have 
become so quickly but so obliviously accus-
tomed.  
 
A world in which we can imagine, and at 
least in principle, speak to, any other man or 
woman on the globe as a neighbour, and access 
virtually any book, idea or image in a matter of 
seconds, is a different world from that in which 
humanity grew up. It is a new world which feeds 
everything from artistic creation to scientific re-
search and from ‘radicalisation’ to the massive 
movements of people. Its positives are widely 
recognised; but alongside those positives we 
have to recognize the ocean of prejudice, bile, 
dishonesty and credulity that it has opened up to 
navigation. This ocean is what the new cultural 
diplomacy must sail. It is a huge challenge. Not 
only have the geographical barriers between 
everyone from terrorists to scientists effectively 
vanished; but the temporal and practical mem-
branes between thought and action have thinned 
to transparency. ‘No sooner thought than done’ 
could be the watchword of young people, 
whether it is the seeking of a friend on the other 
side of the world, the development of a research 
project, the purchase of a weapon or the booking 
of a ticket from Luton to Gaziantep. It is astonish-
ing how quickly we have forgotten the world 
before all this was possible – and imagination is 
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both the currency of this new world and the defi-
cit which Cultural Diplomats need urgently to 
rectify. 
 
New universality of culture  
 
So the fundamental claim is for a new universali-
ty of culture, often in very base forms and for 
global thinking to embrace it urgently. It isn’t just 
diplomacy of course that needs a radical re-
tooling. Industries like journalism, advertising, 
gambling, games-playing, pornography, retail 
sales, air-travel, prostitution, market analysis and 
drug-dealing (to name but a few) have funda-
mentally changed, arriving from nowhere, recon-
figuring themselves and often then disappearing. 
A world where we can print three-dimensional 
objects, and may soon be able to print shoes, 
spark-plugs and pistols in our own homes is not 
the world an older generation grew up in. Its 
possibilities, its dangers and its solutions are 
new. All are cultural; and no one, diplomat or 
businessman, soldier, writer or people-smuggler, 
will escape the need for that understanding. 
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